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Parvaneh Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Companies: The End of
Private Party Enforcement of The
Unfair Practices Act Against Insurance
Companies
The California Supreme Court held in Royal Globe Insurance
Company v. Superior Court' that third party claimants can bring a
cause of action against an insurance company for acting in bad faith
in violation of the Unfair Practices Act.2 In creating the right of
private claimants to bring an action against an insurer for violating
the Unfair Practices Act, the Royal Globe court ignored the well
established rule in Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Company.3 Murphy
held an insurer's duty to settle runs to the insured, not to injured
third parties. 4 Nine years after the Royal Globe decision, it was
overruled in Parvaneh Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Companies5 by stating that the insurance commissioner is the sole
enforcer against an insurance company when the insurer violates the
1. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
2. Id. at 884-85, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845; CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10
(West 1972 & Supp. 1989) (the Unfair Practices Act). See infra notes 12-68 and accompanying
text (discussing the development of the Unfair Practices Act).
3. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 889, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 848 (discussing Murphy).
4. Id. at 941, 553 P.2d at 587, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427. See also Comment, Royal Globe
Insurance Co. v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit Against an Insurer by a Third Party
Claimant, 31 HAsTiNGs L. REv. 1161, 1165 (1980) (discussion of cases leading up to the rule
in Murphy).
5. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
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Unfair Practices Act. 6 The court found the insurance code was not
intended to create a cause of action for private party claimants,
insured or third party, and therefore overruled Royal Globe and
removed the ability of a private claimant to bring an action against
an insurer for violating the Unfair Practices Act. 7
This note assesses the court's decision in Moradi-Shalal. Part I of
this note discusses the Unfair Practice Act, statutory interpretations
of the act, and case law leading to the Royal Globe decisionA Part
II analyzes the Moradi-Shalal decision and impact on the Royal
Globe doctrine.9 Part III discusses possible legal ramifications of
Moradi-Shalal and the scope of any common law remedies available
to a private party plaintiff against the insurer.10
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Regulation of the Insurance Industry in California
The McCarran-Ferguson Act" enables the states to exercise a
majority of control over the insurance industry operating within their
respective states.'2 Accordingly, the Unfair Practices Act, as codified
6. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126-7. The Unfair Practice Act, as
codified within the Insurance Code section 790 lists numerous actions by an insurance company
which give rise to sanctions, but these sanctions are solely for use by the insurance commis-
sioner. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 12-111 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 112-229 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 230-285 and accompanying text.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
12. In Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), the United States Supreme Court
held that insurance contracts were not included within interstate commerce. Paul, at 168. But
in 1944 the United States Supreme Court overruled Paul in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), declaring that regulation of the insurance industry was not
within the sole province of the states. Id. 322 U.S. 533. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1167
(discussing the constitutional case history leading to state regulation of the insurance industry).
In response to South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. Congress intended the McCarran-Ferguson Act to enable the states to
continue having a majority of control over the insurance industry within their states. See
Comment, supra note 5 at 1167 (this act stated the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton
Antitrust Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act are applicable to the insurance industry
only to the extent such business is not regulated by the laws of the state). The McCarran-
Ferguson Act was upheld as constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105
S. Ct. 1676 (1985). In Metropolitan, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act lifted commerce clause restrictions but not equal protection ones. Id.
at 1679. Therefore, the equal protection clause still applies to discrimination against out of
state insurance companies. Id. at 1676.
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in the California Insurance Code, regulates the insurance industry in
California. 3 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) proposed a model draft14 which gave the states a regulation
system to control unfair practices by the insurance industry. 15 Cali-
fornia codified the Unfair Practices Act in the adoption of the
Insurance Code section 790 in 195916 and in large part directly adopted
the model act of the NAIC. 17 In 1972, California added to section
790.03 provisions prohibiting unfair claim settlement practices which
are codified as section 790.03(h). 18
13. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (Vest 1972 and Supp. 1989).
14. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIoNERs, An Act Relating to Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance (1947). See generally Parvaneh
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr.
at 123 (discussion of 2 NAIC Proceedings 392-400, An Act Relating to Unfair Methods of
Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance (1947)).
See also generally infra notes 145-155 and accompanying text (discussing the California Supreme
Court's analysis in Moradi-Shalal of the NAIC Model Act as compared to California and
other states which used the model act as a basis for the state code).
15. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
16. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989). Section 790 states the
purpose of the article is:
To regulate trade practices in the business of insurance in accordance with the intent
of Congress as expressed in the Act of Congress of March 9, 1945 (Public Law 15,
Seventy-ninth Congress), by defining, or providing for the determination of, all such
practices in this state which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or
deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or
determined.
Id.
17. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1737, sec. 1, at 4187 (enacting CAL. INs. CODE §§ 790-790.10)
(California legislature adopting the NAIC Model Act). Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 885, 592
P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (discussing the adoption of the NAIC Model Act by
California).
18. Amended by 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 725, sec. 1, at 1314 (enacting CAL. INS. CODE
§ 790.03(h)(1)-(13)); 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 790, sec. 1, at 1812 (enacting CAL. INS. CODE §
790.03(h)(14)-(15)).
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance.
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice any of the unfair claims settlement practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating
to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation
and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof
of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered
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Section 790.03(h) of the Unfair Practices Act enumerates fifteen
subheadings of what constitutes unfair methods of competition and
unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance. 9
For example, section 790.03 prohibits insurance companies from:
committing misrepresentation, failing to acknowledge and act upon
communications, failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards
for prompt investigation and processing of claims, and failing to
affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time.20 More
specifically, section 790.03(h)(5) states an insurer can be liable for
not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. 21
Further, section 790.03(h)(14) states that an insurer can be liable for
directly advising a claimant not to obtain an attorney. 2
The Unfair Practices Act includes provisions for the enforcement
of the insurance code against insurance companies. 23 The insurance
in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims for
amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to which a
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or
printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative, agent,
or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon
request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing
from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded
in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured,
claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then
requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which
submissions contain substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under
other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in
the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a
claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1989).
19. CAL. INs. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1989).
20. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1989).
21. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) (West Supp. 1989).
22. Id. Section 790.03(h)(5) was the basis for the plaintiff's action in Royal Globe. Royal
Globe Iis. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal 3d at 885, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845
(1979).
23. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.04 (West 1972).
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commissioner has the statutory power to examine and investigate the
affairs of every person engaged in the business of insurance within
California. 24 The commissioner determines whether the insurance
company practices unfair methods of competition or commits decep-
tive or unfair acts.2 If the commissioner finds deceptive or unfair
practices or acts, 26 then the commissioner may issue a cease and
desist order requiring the insurer to refrain from continuing these
practices. 27 Cease and desist orders issued by the commissioner under
The commissioner shall have power to examine and investigate into the affairs of
every person engaged in the business of insurance in the State in order to determine
whether such person has been or is engaged in any unfair method or competition
or in any unfair or deceptive act or practice prohibited by Section 790.03 or
determined pursuant to this article to be an unfair method of competition or an
unfair or deceptive practice in the business of insurance. Such investigation may be
conducted pursuant to Article 2 (commencing at Section 11180) of Chapter 2, Part
1, Division 3, Title 2 of the Government Code.
Id.
24. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.04 (West 1972).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 790.03 (West Supp. 1989). Unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance are:
(a) Making, issuing, circulating, or causing to be made, issued or circulated, any
estimate, illustration, circular or statement misrepresenting the terms of any policy
issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby or the dividends
or share of the surplus to be received thereon, or making any false or misleading
statement as to the dividends or share of surplus previously paid on similar policies,
or making any misleading representation or any misrepresentation as to the financial
condition of any insurer, or as to the legal reserve system upon which any life
insurer operates, or using any name or title of any policy or class of policies
misrepresenting the true nature thereof, or making any misrepresentation to any
policyholder insured in any company for the purpose of inducing or tending to
induce such policyholder to lapse, forfeit, or surrender his insurance.
(b) Making or disseminating or causing to be made or disseminated before the public
in this state, in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device, or
by public outcry or proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatsoever,
any statement containing any assertion, representation or statement with respect to
the business of insurance or with respect to any person in the conduct of his
insurance business, which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, and which is known,
or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue, deceptive
or misleading.
(c) Entering into any agreement to commit, or by any concerted action committing,
any act of boycott, coercion or intimidation resulting in or tending to result in
unreasonable restraint of, or monopoly in, the business of insurance.
(d) Filing with any supervisory or other public official, or making, publishing,
disseminating, circulating or delivering to any person, or placing before the public,
or causing directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated,
delivered to any person, or placed before the public any false statement of financial
condition of an insurer with the intent to deceive ....
Id.
27. Id. § 790.05 (vest 1972). Section 790.05 provides for a hearing when the commissioner
has reason to believe any person is engaged in an unfair method of competition or any unfair
or deceptive act or practice. Id. The hearing is held not less than thirty days after service of
notice by the commissioner. Id. If the commissioner finds any of the charges as justified then
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the provisions of the Unfair Practices Act do not absolve an insurer
from civil liability or criminal penalty under the laws of the state
arising out of the methods, acts, or practices found unfair or decep-
tive.28
B. Case Law Interpretation of the Unfair Practices Act.
Prior to Royal Globe, California appellate courts interpreted sec-
tion 790.03(h) as providing a cause of action by third party claimants
against insurers committing unfair acts or practices. 29 These appellate
decisions served as the basis for Royal Globe which held that the
Unfair Practices Act affords both a private cause of action and a
third party claim against the insurer. 0 Moradi-Shalal overruled these
cases along with Royal Globe.31
The appellate courts previously held that section 790.09 contem-
plates a private action to impose civil liability. 2 For example, Green-
section 790.05 states in part, "If ... justified the commissioner shall issue and cause to be
served upon such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from engaging in
such methods, acts, or practices as have been found to be unfair or deceptive." Id. A hearing
under section 790.07 is available when the commissioner has reason to believe that any person
violated a cease and desist order pursuant to section 790.05, or a court order pursuant to
section 790.06. Id. After the hearing, if the violation was found to have occurred, the
commissioner has the power to fine the party. Id. The fine is not to exceed $5,000 unless the
act was willfully done, then the fine is not to exceed $55,000. Id. For any subsequent violations
the commissioner may, after a hearing, suspend or revoke the license of certificate of that
person not to exceed one year. Id. § 790.07 (vest Supp. 1989).
28. Id. § 790.09 (West 1972).
No order to cease and desist issued under this article directed to any person or
subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce the same shall in any
way relieve or absolve such person from any administrative action against the license
or certificate of such person, civil liability or criminal acts or practices found unfair
or deceptive.
Id.
29. Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr.
470 (1973) (section 790.03 does give private parties the ability to successfully bring a cause of
action); Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975) (a private
claimant does not have to exhaust all administrative avenues with the insurance commissioner
before bringing an action based on a violation under section 790.03(h)); Homestead Supplies
v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 992, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978) (a later case
affirming the reasoning of both Greenberg and Shernofj). "These well-reasoned authorities
make it clear, therefore, that private litigants may rely upon the proscriptions set forth in the
act as a basis for the imposition of civil liability upon the insurer." Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d
at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
30. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 888-89, 592 P.2d at 334-35, 153 Cal. Rptr. 847-48.
31. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
32. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470. See infra notes 32-41 and
accompanying text (discussing Greenberg).
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berg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society33 held that a private party
claimant can bring an action under the Unfair Practices Act irre-
spective of any action by the government against the insurer.
3 4
Greenberg was a class action filed against the insurance company for
offering and promoting home loans secured by deeds of trust on the
condition that the borrower purchase life insurance from the defen-
dant and assign the policy as further security for the indebtedness.
35
In Greenberg, the insurer, Equitable Life, argued that section 790.03
enforcement was vested exclusively in the insurance commissioner.
3 6
The court responded by stating section 790.09 gives the insured the
power to enforce the Unfair Practices Act by an appropriate civil
action regardless of any action taken by the insurance commissioner.
37
The Greenberg court held that the sole disciplinary authority of
the insurance commissioner in this case was either to issue a cease
and desist order or to obtain an injunction to restrain the illegal
conduct. 38 Greenberg, an insured suing on behalf of a class, sought
33. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
34. Id. at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
35. Id. at 996, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 472. Section 790.03(c) must be construed in light of
statutes prohibiting activities in restraint of trade in business other than insurance. Id. at 998-
99, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 473. See also Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 69 Cal.
2d 305, 444 P.2d 481, 70 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1968) (the California statute is similar to the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1914), and goes beyond the common law and the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1890), to inhibit the trade restraints at their inception, the Cartwright Act, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16700 (West 1941) and common law are expressly superseded and
contravened by specific provisions in the California Insurance Code). At issue in Greenberg
was whether the actions by the insurer equaled coercion. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 999,
110 Cal. Rptr. at 474. In Greenberg, the court found coercion prohibited by subdivision (c)
as "coercion in the antitrust sense, conduct which constitutes the improper use of economic
power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it." Id. See also Atlantic
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 368-69 (1965) (tire manufacurers and gas distributors agreed
to promote tires, batteries, and accessories by reduction of gas prices in exchange for
commissions on sales made by such retailers, was an unfair method of competition); Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964) (a private antitrust case holding a supplier cannot
use coercion on retail outlets to achieve resale price maintenance); United States v. National
Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n, 40 F. Supp. 448, 455 (D.C. Colo.) (1941) (under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is
illegal per se).
36. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 472. See infra notes 221-229
and accompanying text (Justice Mosk in the Moradi-Shalal dissent discussing Greenberg as
precedent for Royal Globe finding a private cause of action within the Unfair Practices Act).
37. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 472. In a footnote the court
said any other construction of section 790.09 would overturn by implication the rule of Crisci
v. Security Insurance Company, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1001 n.5, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475 n.5. See infra notes 83-95 and
accompanying text (discussion of CriscO.
38. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
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damages for the coercive actions of Equitable Life.39 The court noted
that the Unfair Practices Act at section 790.09 specifically provides
the insurance commissioner cannot relieve or absolve the insurer from
a claim for damages. 40 The court therefore held that an insured did
not have to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a
civil action against an insurer.
41
Similarly, Shernoff v. Superior Court 2 supports the result in
Greenberg but like Greenberg was overruled by Moradi-Shalal.4 1
Shernoff was a class action by the insureds against a title insurer for
damages incurred by a conspiracy to fix title insurance rates. 44 The
insurer, The Title Insurance and Trust Company, asserted that the
insured plaintiffs had not exhausted all administrative remedies before
the commissioner before bringing the civil action, and therefore
argued that a demurrer should be granted. 4 The superior court held
that the insurance commissioner should be given first opportunity to
act on the rate fixing allegations.46
As in Greenberg, the Shernoff court agreed that exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not required under the language of the
Unfair Practices Act.47 The Shernoff court found the Unfair Practices
Act, in section 790.09, to reserve expressly to litigants all civil and
criminal remedies against persons who have violated the law. 48 The
court found section 790.0449 and section 790.050 as keeping within
39. Id. at 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
40. Id. at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475. See CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972).
41. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1101, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475. "At most, the potential
administrative remedy before the insurance commissioner bears upon us the propriety of the
class action aspect of appellant's cause. That issue is not before us." Id. at 1001 n.6, 110
Cal. Rptr. at 475 n.6.
42. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975).
43. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 287, 758 P.2d at 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 116. See Shernoff,
44 Cal. App. 3d at 409-10, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82. The Shernoff court agreed with the
finding of Greenberg and quoted from the decision at length concerning the discussion of
section 790.09. Id. at 410, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
44. Shernoff, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 408, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 410, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
48. Id. at 409, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 681. See CA. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972). "No
order to cease and desist issued under this article directed to any person or subsequent
administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce the same shall in any way relieve or absolve
such person from any ... civil liability ... under the laws of this State arising out of the
methods, acts or practices found unfair or deceptive." Shernoff, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 409, 118
Cal. Rptr. at 682.
49. CAL. INs. CODE § 790.04 (West 1972). See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text
(discussing section 790.04).
50. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.05 (West 1972). See supra note 27 and accompanying text
(discussing section 790.05).
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the courts, not the insurance commissioner, the power to award
money judgments.5 1 Since the insured plaintiffs here sought damages
for past illegal conduct, no reason existed for allowing only the
insurance commissioner to enforce the Unfair Practices Act against
the insurer.52 The court held that the commissioner had disciplinary
authority limited to restraint of future illegal conduct, and that the
commissioner possessed no authority to enter money judgments against
the insurer for past injuries to an insured.
5 3
The California Supreme Court in Royal Globe agreed with the
Greenberg and Shernoff decisions and upheld the filing of a civil
suit against the insurer under the Unfair Practices Act.
5 4 The Royal
Globe court differentiated between the NAIC Model Act, on which
the California act was based, and section 790.03 as adopted by
California.5 5 The Model Act states that a person shall not be absolved
of liability under any "other" state laws.5 6 The California act in
section 790.09 eliminates the word "other" and provides that an
insurer shall not be absolved from civil liability "under the laws of
the state" arising out of the unfair acts of the insurer.
5 7 The Royal
Globe court found this omission of the word "other" as affirmative
authority for the filing of a civil suit based on alleged violations of
the act.58 The court found the intentional omission of "other"
significant as implying that the California legislature intended to
endorse civil actions based on the Unfair Practices Act.
59
51. Shernoff, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 409, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 410, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 682. See Homestead Supplies v. Executive Life Ins. Co.,
81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 992, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22, 30 (1978) (reiterating the basic principles of the
holdings of Greenberg and Shernoff that the doctrine of promissory estoppel kept the insurer
from claiming no consideration for the modification to the insurance contract).
54. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
55. Id.
56. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE ComIssIoNERs, An Act Relating to Unfair
Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of
Insurance, 2 NAIC Proceedings 392 (1947). See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23
Cal. 3d at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (1979). See supra notes 14-68 and
accompanying text (discussing the NAIC Model Act and the development of the California
Unfair Practices Act).
57. Compare CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972) with NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF
INsURANCE ColnT ssioNEas, An Act Relating to Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair
and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance (1980). See Royal Globe, 23
Cal. 3d at 886-87, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The Royal Globe court found
this shows the intent to include a civil cause of action under section 790.03(h) of the act.
Id.
58. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 885, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
59. Id. at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
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The plaintiff in Royal Globe, a third party claimant, was allowed
to bring suit under section 790.03(h) of the Unfair Practices Act.60
However, Royal Globe Insurance Company, the insurer, argued that
Greenberg was distinguishable because the complaint in Greenberg
was based on "tie-in sales" 61 coercion by the insurer, an illegal
practice even without the provisions in section 790.03.62 The Royal
Globe court affirmed Greenberg, however, expressly recognizing that
only the Unfair Practices Act prohibits anticompetitive activity by
an insurer, and a private party can rely upon section 790.03(h) in
bringing a private suit for civil damages.63 The language of section
790.03(h) is ambiguous and has been interpreted in different ways.
Under section 790.03(h) the insurance company must have knowingly
committed, or performed with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice, the numerous practices listed in section 790.03. 64
In Royal Globe, the majority interpreted section 790.03(h) as requir-
ing the claimant to show either that the insurance company knew of
the unfair practices or that the actions taken were the common
business practice of the company.65 However, in Moradi-Shalal, the
60. Id. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
61. "Tie-in" sales or a tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to
sell one product but only on the condition the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 472-473. The complaint in
Greenberg alleged that the insurer offered otherwise secured loans to home owners only on
restrictive conditions. Id. The insured plaintiff charged the insurer required the borrower to
purchase high cost cash value adjustable whole life insurance from the insurer. Greenberg, 34
Cal. App 3d at 996, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 472. Along with this purchase the insured was required
to borrow the entire amount available on any existing policies of life insurance issued to him
by other insurers to assist in paying for insurance issued by the insurer defendant. Id. The
pleading further alleged the insurance company promoted and offered the home loans on the
condition that after purchasing the life insurance, in the amount of the home loan, the insured
plaintiff assign it over to the insurer. Id. The pleading also stated the insured plaintiffs could
have secured insurance from other insurance companies at a cost less than the policy the
insured sold as a condition of the home loan. Id. at 997, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 472473. Tie-in
agreements are inherently coercive; underlying the illegality of such agreements is the assumption
that, " .. . such arrangements coerce the buyer into taking a product he doesn't want ... I
and that ' . . . buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing products."
Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 472-473.
62. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 886-87, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846. See
Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 470 (discussing coercive tie-in sales).
63. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 885-86, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The court
in Greenberg determined that the Cartwright Act (Business & Professional Code section 16700)
antitrust provisions did not apply to insurance companies and therefore only section 790.03
prohibits insurers from engaging in anticompetitive activity. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at
999 n.2, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 474 n.2.
64. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1989).
65. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 890, 592 P.2d 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849. Royal Globe
Insurance argued a third party claimant could not base an action against the insurer upon a
single instance of unfair conduct. Id. at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849. Royal
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court interpreted this language more narrowly in stating that a
claimant would have a hard time proving a frequency of unfair
practices by the insurer. The Moradi-Shalal court further stated that
no other state has agreed with Royal Globe in holding a showing of
one unfair practice was a sufficient basis for an action against the
insurance company under the Unfair Practices Act. 66 According to
the Moradi-Shalal court, a claimant would have a hard time proving
a general business practice and showing one unfair act is not suffi-
cient, therefore, section 790.03 was intended as a source of power
for the insurance commissioner alone.67
C. Common Law Based Actions Prior to Royal Globe
In addition to the interpretations of the Unfair Practices Act, a
separate body of law has established a basis for nonstatutory civil
actions against an insurer for acting in bad faith. In 1958, the
California Supreme Court in Comunale v. Traders & General Insur-
ance Company6s held that a breach by the insurer of an express
obligation to defend the insured did not release the insurer from the
implied duty to consider the interest of the insured in the settlement.
69
In Comunale, the insurer wrongfully refused to defend the insured
and refused a reasonable settlement within the policy limits. 70 The
Globe argued that improper conduct was actionable only if committed with such frequency as
to indicate a general business practice. Id. The court rejected this argument and held the
claimant could show either knowledge or frequency of improper conduct to establish liability.
Id.
66. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
67. Id.
68. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). Comunale was an action by pedestrians who
were walking across a street and were struck by the insured driver. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at
656, 328 P.2d at 200. The Comunales sued the insurer, Traders & General Insurance Company,
to recover the portion of their judgment against the driver not paid by the insured. Id. Traders
was obligated to defend any personal injury suit covered by the policy, but was given the right
to make such settlement as the insurer might deem expedient. Id. The Comunales sued the
truck driver and Traders refused to represent him. Id. The Comunales also offered to settle
for $4000 and Traders again refused. Id. The truck driver insisted Traders assume the defense
and settlement of the case. Id. Traders refused and the trial court entered judgment for Mr.
Comunale for $25,000 and Mrs. Comunale for $1,250. Id. The insured did not pay the
judgment, and the Comunales sued Traders under a provision in the insured's policy that
permitted an injured party to maintain an action after obtaining judgment against the insured.
Id. at 657, 328 P.2d at 200.
69. Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 202 (where there is no opportunity to compromise the claim
and the only wrongful act of the insurer is the refusal to defend, liability of the insurer is
usually limited to the amount of the policy plus attorney's fees and costs but, such a rule
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Comunales, third party plaintiffs, obtained an assignment of all of
the insured's rights against the insurer Traders and then commenced
an action to recover from Traders the excess of the judgment against
the insured. 71 The insurer was held liable for the entire judgment
rendered against the insured even though it exceeded the policy
limits. 72
In reaching the result of liability against Traders, the insurer, the
court first stated that an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing exists in all contracts.73 The court further held that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to insurance policies. 74
The Comunale court held that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing requires the insurer to settle, in an appropriate case,
although express terms of the policy do not impose a duty to settle.75
In reaching this holding, the court reaffirmed Brown v. Superior
Court,76 which held every contract has an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything that injures
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the contract. 77 If
found liable for a tort based on the bad faith refusal to settle, the
insurer can be liable for amounts in excess of the insurance policy
limits; otherwise the insurer is liable only to the policy limit.78
71. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
72. Id. The court defined situations in which the insurer may be found liable for the
whole amount of a settlement regardless of the policy limit. Id. First, when the insurer defends
the insured and is guilty of bad faith in refusing a settlement. Id. Second, when an insurer
denies coverage even though its position may not have been entirely groundless, if the denial
is found wrongful then the insurer is liable for the full amount which will compensate insured
for all detriment caused by insurer's breach of the express and implied obligations under the
contract. Id. Third, when there is no opportunity to compromise the claim and the only
wrongful act of the insurer is refusal to defend, liability is usually limited to the policy amount
plus attorney's fees and cost, unless the insurer wrongfully refuses to accept a reasonable
settlement offer. Id. at 654, 328 P.2d at 198.
73. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 657, 328 P.2d at 200 (quoting, Brown v. Superior Court,
34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878 (1949)) (Brown held there was an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure
the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the agreement).
74. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200. See Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W.
257 (1930). The Hilker court pointed out the rights of the insured, "go deeper than the mere
surface of the contract written for him by the defendent" and that implied obligations are
imposed "based upon those principles of fair dealing which enter into every contract."
Comunale, 50 Cal 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201 (quoting Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis.
at 2, 231 N.W. at 258 (1930)).
75. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
76. 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949).
77. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201. See Brown, 34. Cal. 2d at 564, 212
P.2d at 881.
78. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 428, 426 P.2d 173, 175-76, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 15-16 (1967). See Comment, supra note 5, at 1164.
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In Comunale, the third party plaintiffs brought the action against
the insurer by an assignment of the insured's rights under his insur-
ance policy.79 The Comunale court held that an insured can assign
the rights under the policy regardless of any provision in the policy
requiring the insurer's approval.80 The court in Comunale also stated
that an action for damages in excess of the policy limits based on
an insurer's wrongful failure to settle is assignable whether the action
is considered as sounding in tort or in contract."
The proposition in Comunale that the implied covenant would
require an insurer to settle in an appropriate case82 was affirmed in
Crisci v. Security Insurance Company.83 Crisci, unlike Comunale,
was not a suit based on an assignment. The insured plaintiff, Crisci,
sought a recovery from the insurer, Security Insurance, on a judgment
obtained against her when Security Insurance failed to settle before
the suitA4 Crisci claimed Security Insurance breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to settle for
$9000., since her policy limit was $10,000.85 The judgment against
Crisci was $101,000.86 Crisci argued that in wrongfully refusing to
settle for less than the policy limit, Security Insurance breached the
79. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 661, 328 P.2d at 200, 202.
80. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 660, 328 P.2d at 202. The court found it was well-settled
that such a provision does not preclude the transfer of a cause of action for damages for a
breach of contract. Id. See Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 30 Cal. 2d 335, 339-340,
182 P.2d 182 (1947) (holding that a provision requiring approval by the insurer of any
assignment does not preclude the transfer of a cause of action for damages for breach of
contract). This rule has been applied to provisions against assignability in insurance policies
similar to the provision involved in the Comunale case. Id.
81. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 660-61, 328 P.2d at 202. The court stated the rule that
although a wrongful refusal to settle has generally been treated as a tort, where a case sounds
both in contract and in tort the plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom of election between an
action in tort and one of contract. Id. at 662, 328 P.2d at 203. See Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co.,
155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 693-95 (1958). In deciding whether the refusal by an insurer to settle
a claim within the policy limits against the insured constitutes a breach of duty by the insurer
to exercise good faith, factors which should be considered are: strength of claimant's case,
attempts by insurer to induce the insured to contribute to the settlement, failure of the insurer
to properly investigate the claim, a rejection of advice by the insurer of the attorney for the
insurer, failure of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer, amount of financial
risk to which each party is exposed in event of refusal to settle, fault of the insured in inducing
the insurer to reject the compromise offer by giving misleading facts, and any other factors
which tend to negate or establish bad faith on the part of the insurer. Id.
82. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 660, 328 P.2d at 201.
83. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). Crisci was an action by the
insured, against whom a judgment for $101,000 had been entered, against the insurer for
refusing to settle for $9,000 on a $10,000 policy. The suit was based on a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.
84. Id. at 427-28, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
85. Id. at 428-29, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
86. Id.
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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and therefore was
liable for the entire $101,000 judgment even though the judgment
far exceeded her $10,000 policy limit.87
In Crisci, the California Supreme Court held that the insurer had
a duty to the insured to accept reasonable settlements.88 The Crisci
court holding was based on the duty of the insurer to consider the
interest of the insured in settlement offers,8 9 a duty inherent in the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 90 The court stated
that whether the insurer had given adequate consideration to the
interests of the insured, in reference to settlement offers, was tested
by asking whether in the same situation a prudent insurer without
policy limits would accept the offer. 91 The liability against Security
87. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. The court stated that although
Comunale was mainly concerned with the contract aspect of the action, Comunale was correct
in stating that an action which sounds in both tort and contract was ordinarily at the plaintiff's
discretion to bring a suit in tort or contract. Id. at 432 n.3, 426 P.2d at 178 n.3, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 18 n.3 (the court also stated that although this rule was applied in Comunale to a
statute of limitations, the rule also was applicable in determining liability).
88. Id. at 430-31, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 430-31, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d
at 899, 592 P.2d at 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 854. "It thus becomes clear that Greenberg assumed
that it was necessary to construe section 790.03 as 'contemplating' a private action in order
to preserve the Crisci rule". Id. at 898, 592 P.2d at 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
91. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. See Kinder v. Western
Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 900, 42 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1965) (when a claim is made
against an insured for damages resulting from an automobile accident, the automobile liability
insurer must give at least as much consideration to the interest of the insured as the insurer
gives to its own interest in attempting to settle the claim against the insured); Critz v. Farmers
Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 798, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964) (without regard to a policy
limit on liability, an insurer may be liable for the entire amount of a judgment against the
insured if the insurer has been guilty of bad faith in refusing an offer of settlement within
the policy limits); Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, 183,
39 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1964) (where the insurer engaged in compromise negotiations for the claim
against the insured and the injured party offered to settle for limits of the policy, the insurer
was under a duty to exercise good faith in considering the interest of the insured in the
settlement); Davy v. Public Nat. Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 400, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960)
(policy of public liability insurance by which the insurer is required to defend an action on a
claim covered by the insurance policy, and is authorized to compromise such within the policy
limits, imposes upon the insurer the obligation to exercise good faith in considering an offer
of compromise within those limits; such an obligation is implied in every such contract); See
also, Hodges v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 579, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1962) (failure to communicate offers of settlement, standing alone without other elements of
1Vad faith or conflict of interests, does not justify finding of bad faith and imposition of
liability on the insurer for judgment in excess of the policy limits). The Crisci court said this
proposed rule was a simple one to apply and would avoid the burdens of a determination
whether a settlement offer within the policy limits was reasonable. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 431,
426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. The rule would eliminate the danger that an insurer,
faced with a settlement offer at or near the policy limits, would reject it and "gamble with
the insured's money" to further its own interests. Id. The court also found elementary justice
in the rule which would require that, in the situation where the insured's and insurer's interests
1386
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Insurance for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was imposed not for a bad faith breach on the policy, but
rather for failure of the duty to accept the reasonable settlement. 92
The court held that the duty is to accept reasonable offers, not just
to avoid acting in bad faith. 93 The court also stated that although
several prior cases contained language to the effect that bad faith is
the equivalent of dishonesty, fraud, and concealment, the absence of
any evidence of these is not fatal to a cause of action.
94
The duty from Crisci of an insurer to accept reasonable settlements
was clarified in Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Company.95 The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Murphy held that the insurer's duty to
settle runs to the insured, not to a third party claimant. 96 Therefore,
the third party claimant can bring suit only on the insurance contract
if there is an assignment from the insured to the third party. 97 The
court, citing Comunale, said that the insured may assign the cause
of action for breach of the duty to settle without consent of the
insurance carrier, even when the policy provisions require approval
by the insurer of the assignment. 98
conflict, the insurer, which may reap the benefits of its determination not to settle, should
also suffer the detriments of its decision. Id.
92. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 432, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. The court said Crisci
was entitled to recover $25,000 from the insurer for mental suffering. Id. Crisci had arranged
settlement with a judgment creditor whereby latter received $22,000, a 40% interest in insured's
claim to a particular piece of property and an assignment of insured's cause of action against
insurer. Id. Crisci, an immigrant widow of seventy, became indigent, then worked as a
babysitter while her rent was paid by her grandchildren. Id. She also had declining health and
hysteria and attempted suicide. Crisci, at 427-428, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
93. Id, at 432-33, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
94. Id.
95. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
96. Id. at 944, 553 P.2d at 588, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
"A third party should not be permitted to enforce covenants made not for his
benefit, but rather for others. He is not a contracting party; his right to performance
is predicated on the contracting parties' intent to benefit him." (citations omitted)
"As to any provision made not for his benefit but for the benefit of the contracting
parties or for other third parties, he becomes an intermeddier. Permitting a third
party to enforce a covenant made solely to benefit others would lead to the anomaly
of granting him a bonus after his receiving all intended benefits. Because, as we
have seen, the duty to settle is intended to benefit the insured and not the injured




98. Id. at 942, 553 P.2d at 587, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427. See also Shapero v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1971) (where interests of the insured and the
insurer are in conflict, and the insurer breaches the duty to consider in good faith the interest
of the insured in settling the claim, damages to the insured may be measured by the entire
amount of the excess liability). See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing
1387
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
Murphy established the rule that the duty of the insurer to settle
a bona fide claim runs to the insured, not an injured third party.9
Under Murphy, the insured could sue the insurer for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the insurer had
wrongfully refused to settle and a judgment exceeding the policy
limits was rendered. 10 Following Murphy, the injured party can sue
the insured or can obtain an assignment of the insured's cause of
action. 101 Then, the third party can proceed directly against the
insurance company. 02 When the injured third party receives an
assignment from the insured, the insured usually receives in return a
covenant from the third party not to execute further actions against
the insured.103
In Royal Globe, the court took a much broader view of the right
of a third party claimant to bring an action against the insurer."
°4
The Royal Globe court holding extended beyond the holding of Crisci
and without much analysis or explanation implicitly overruled Mur-
phy. °s The Royal Globe court held that a third party claimant can
bring a cause of action against an insurer for violation of the Unfair
Practices Act.'0 The court held that the third party plaintiff could
bring suit against the insurer for violation of section 790.03(h)(5)
and (14) because these subdivisions create a duty the insurer owes
directly to the plaintiff as a claimant. °7 The Royal Globe court
distinguished Murphy, stating that the Murphy requirement of as-
signment before a suit by a third party claimant was based on
contractual principles. 0 8 In Royal Globe, the third party claimant
did not base her suit on the insurance policy between the insured
and the insurer; instead she brought suit against the insurer based
on a violation of section 790.03(h).109 The court held that since the
suit was not based on a breach of contract to the insured, as in
Comunale and the ability to assign regardless of a clause in the insurance policy requiring
approval by the insurer).
99. Murphy, 17 Cal. 3d at 942, 553 P.2d at 588, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427.




104. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884., 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
105. Id. at 884-85, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
106. Id. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
107. Id. at 889-90, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848. See supra notes 12-68 and
accompanying text (discussing section 790.03 of the insurance code).
108. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 889, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
109. Id. at 889-90, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
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Murphy, no assignment from the insured to the third party claimant
was necessary as a precedent to the claimant's bringing suit against
the insurer. 10
II. THE CASE
Nine years after Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court over-
ruled Royal Globe in Parvaneh Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund
Insurance Companies."' In Moradi-Shalal, the court held that section
790.03(h) does not give a private cause of action to insured or third
party claimants against an insurer for violations by the insurer of
the Unfair Practices Act." 2 The Moradi-Shalal court directly rejected
the reasoning of Royal Globe that section 790.03(h) imposed a duty
on the insurer directly to the third party claimant.1 3 The court in
Moradi-Shalal also pointed out that Royal Globe was contrary to
the unanimous decision of the same court in Murphy that the insurer




In July 1983, plaintiff, Parvaneh Moradi-Shalal, was injured in an
automobile accident when a vehicle driven negligently by the insured
struck her vehicle." 5 In 1984, after requesting a settlement from the
insurer of the driver, Fireman's Fund, and receiving no acknowl-
edgement of her request, Moradi-Shalal again wrote Fireman's Fund
requesting settlement of her damages and giving notification that she
was reserving her right of action under Royal Globe."16 Moradi-Shalal
sued the insured driver." 7 Five months later, Moradi-Shalal settled
110. Id.
111. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
112. Id. The court stated the clear intent of the insurance code was to give to the insurance
commissioner sole power of enforcement against the insurance companies which violate the
insurance code. Id. at 303-04, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
113. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126. See supra
notes generally 55-68 and accompanying text (discussing Royal Globe).
114. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 295, 758 P.2d at 61, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 120. See supra
notes 96-109 and accompanying text (discussing Murphy).
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with the driver, and the suit was dismissed with prejudice.118 After-
ward, Moradi-Shalal brought an action against Fireman's Fund under
Royal Globe based on Fireman's Fund's refusal to fairly settle her
claim promptly and fairly against the insured." 9
Moradi-Shalal alleged that the defendant insurer, Fireman's Fund,
violated section 790.03(h) subdivisions (2), (3) and (5) of the Unfair
Practices Act.120 Her complaint stated that Fireman's Fund did not
acknowledge or act upon her letters, did not promptly investigate or
process the claim, and did not make a good faith attempt to make
a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim in which liability
was reasonably clear.'12  The trial court sustained Fireman's Fund's
general demurrer without leave to amend.'2 The court of appeals
reversed. 23
B. The Decision
The California Supreme Court granted review of Moradi-Shalal in
an attempt to resolve the widespread confusion in the way the
appellate courts were applying Royal Globe. 24 However, upon re-
ceiving arguments the court was confronted with the more funda-
mental question of whether Royal Globe should be overruled. 2- In
Moradi-Shalal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court
118. Id.
119. Id. Her subsequent complaint against the defendant insurer for violations of section
790.03, subdivisions (h)(2), (3), and (5) alleged numerous bad faith acts by the insurer. Id.
See supra notes 16-18 (discussing section 790 of the Unfair Practices Act as codified in the
Insurance Code).
120. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 292-93, 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118. See supra
notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing section 790.03(h) of the Unfair Practices Act).
121. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 292-93, 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118. Plaintiff
alleged in her complaint that defendant "did not acknowledge or act upon [her attorney's]
communication, did not promptly investigate or process [the] claim, and did not attempt in
good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim, in which liability
was reasonably clear." Id.
122. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 293, 758 P.2d at 60-61, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 119. The trial
court based the decision to dismiss on the absence of a final judgment in the underlying action
which therefore precluded a Royal Globe action against Fireman's Fund. Id. See infra note
183-199 and accompanying text (discussing the Moradi-Shalal requirement of a final "judicial"
determination of the insured's liability prior to any action against the insurer).
123. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 293, 758 P.2d at 60-61, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 119. The court
of appeals reversed holding that a settlement with prejudice was a sufficient conclusion of the
underlying action to support a subsequent Royal Globe action against the insurer. Id. See
infra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the final "judicial" determination requirement
in Moradi-Shalal).
124. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 292, 758 P.2d at 59, Cal. Rptr. at 118.
125. Id.
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order sustaining the demurrer by defendant, Fireman's Fund.1 26 In
affirming the trial court, the California Supreme Court reversed the
appeals court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 127 The
majority opinion of Moradi-Shalal was written by Justice Lucas and
the dissenting opinion was written by Justice Mosk, who also wrote
the majority opinion in Royal Globe.'2
The Moradi-Shalal decision creates a substantial change in Cali-
fornia law that can be analyzed by dividing the holding into three
major areas. First, the Unfair Practices Act, as codified in the
Insurance Code, did not create any private cause of action in favor
of insured or third party claimants. 2 9 Second, the rule in Moradi-
Shalal that no private cause of action existed under the Insurance
Code, would not be applied retroactively to plaintiffs who had already
initiated actions. 130 Third, final judicial determination of the insured's
liability is a condition precedent to any action by a third party
claimant in order to recover for the insurer's alleged bad faith failure
to settle.'
1. No Private Cause of Action Under The Unfair Practices Act
The majority of the Moradi-Shalal court found the gratuitous
creation of a new remedy in Royal Globe wholly inconsistent with
the precedent established by the California Supreme Court. 32 The
126. Id. at 313, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
127. Id.
128. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 313, 758 P.2d at 75, Cal. Rptr. at 133. See generally
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842
(1979).
129. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
130. Id. at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127. The court uses the language "unfair
practices" instead of Royal Globe when discussing the requirements for the cases which were
filed under Royal Globe prior to Moradi-Shalal becoming final. Id.
131. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28. In Royal
Globe, the court stated a requirement for "prior determination of the insured's liability"
before a civil action could be brought against the insurer. Id. (citing Royal Globe Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (1979)). After
Royal Globe, the lower courts had difficulty in deciding what was a sufficient prior determi-
nation of liability. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 306, 758 P.2d at 70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
In Moradi-Shalal, the court clarified this requirement for the Royal Globe cases filed prior to
Moradi-Shalal becoming final. Id. Moradi-Shalal requires a final judicial determination of the
insured's liability; therefore any other type of settlement beyond a judicial determination will
not meet the condition precedent for a Royal Globe suit. Id. at 308, 758 P.2d at 71, 250 Cal.
Rptr. at 129. In Moradi-Shalal, the court found the plaintiff did not have a sufficient conclusion
of the insured's liability to warrant her action against Fireman's Fund and reversed in favor
of Fireman's Fund. Id. at 313, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
132. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
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court stated that the decision in Royal Globe was contrary to the
unanimous decision in Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Company, which
held that the duty of the insurer to settle runs to the insured, not to
an injured third party claimant. 33 The majority adopted Justice
Richardson's reasoning in his Royal Globe dissent where he stated
California has consistently held that the duty of the insurer to settle,
when liability of the insured is reasonably clear, runs to the insured. 3 4
The court held that section 790.03(h) did not create an independent
duty in the insurer to a third party claimant. 35 The court further
held that section 790.03(h) did not create grounds for civil liability
based on a violation of the Unfair Practices Act. 36 The majority
also found Royal Globe inconsistent with a fair and reasoned analysis
of the Unfair Practices Act. 137 Again, agreeing with the dissent in
Royal Globe, the majority in Moradi-Shalal stated that if the legis-
lature had intended to create a third party right of action in the
Unfair Practices Act, the legislature could have easily and clearly
done so. 38
The majority stated that prior applicable precedent usually must
be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be
decided differently by the current justices. 39 The majority further
explained that stare decisis is based on the assumption that certainty,
predictability, and stability in the law are the major objectives of
the legal system. 40 The Moradi-Shalal court, however, also empha-
sized the well-established rule that stare decisis is a flexible policy
that permits the court to reconsider, and depart from if necessary,
prior precedent in an appropriate case.' 4' In overruling Royal Globe,
the court applied this flexibility policy because although stare decisis
serves the important functions of certainty, predictability, and sta-
133. Id. See Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr.
424 (1976).
134. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 295, 758 P.2d at 61, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 120. See Royal
Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 892, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850
(1979) (Richardson, J. dissenting).
135. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
136. Id. See Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 892, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850 (1979)
(Richardson, J. dissenting).
137. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 120. See Royal
Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 898, 592 P.2d at 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (Richardson, J. dissenting).
138. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 295, 758 P.2d at 61, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
139. Id. at 296, 758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
140. Id. " . .. that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into
relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law." Id.
141. Id. "But, this policy is a flexible one which permits this court to reconsider, and
ultimately depart from, our own prior precedent in an appropriate case." Id.
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bility in the legal system, court-created error should not be shielded
from correction. 4
2
Like forty-eight other states, California derived the State Unfair
Practices Act from the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioner's Model Unfair Claims Practices Act. 143 The majority in Mor-
adi-Shalal found that the courts of nineteen of those states, not
including California, had addressed the issue whether the act created
a private action. 44 Seventeen of those nineteen states had refused to
recognize a Royal Globe action.145 Further, the court in eight of
those states acknowledged but declined to follow Royal Globe,'46
while the court in nine other states implicitly rejected the Royal
Globe holding by interpreting the statutory language differently from
Royal Globe without mentioning the case. 147 The majority noted that
142. Id. 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (quoting Cianci v.
Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 924 (1985)).
143. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297-98, 758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
See supra notes 29-68 and accompanying text (discussing the history and interpretation of the
Unfair Practices Act).
144. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297, 758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
145. Id. 46 Cal. 3d at 297-98, 758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
146. Id. See A & E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669, 673-75
(4th Cir. 1986) (Virginia Unfair Insurance Practices Act does not create a private cause of
action in tort); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 96, 730 P.2d 1014, 1020-21
(1986) (there is a common law duty on part of insurers to their insureds to settle first-party
claims in good faith and breach of that duty will give rise to action in tort, but the Idaho
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act does not give rise to private right of action whereby
insured can sue the insurer for statutory violations in settling claims); Scroggins v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1029, 393 N.E.2d 718, 723-25 (1979) (no right of private action
given in the Unfair Practices Act); Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 40-43
(Iowa 1982) (the statute, I.C.A. § 507B.4(9)(f), defining unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance does not create a cause of
action for damages in individuals entitled to insurance proceeds when an insurance carrier has
violated that statute); Earth Scientists v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 619 F. Supp. 1465,
1470-71 (1985) (Kansas Uniform Trade Practices Act does not provide a private cause of action
in favor of an insured for a violation by the insurer of the Act); Tweet v. Webster, 610 F.
Supp. 104, 105 (1985) (Nevada does not recognize existence of any statutory duty running
from the insurer to the insured requiring the insurer to negotiate settlements in good faith);
Patterson v. Globe American Cas. Co., 101 N.M. 541, 541-42, 685 P.2d 396, 397-98 (1984)
(no private cause of action against an insurer by an insured under the Unfair Insurance
Practices Act); Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297 n.4, 758 P.2d at 62 n.4, 250 Cal. Rptr. 121
n.4.
147. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297-98, 758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
See Young v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Mich. 1984) (insured had no
private cause of action in tort for violation of the provisions of the Uniform Trade Practices
Act by an insurer); Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 234-38 (Minn.
1986) (private party does not have a cause of action against an insurer for a violation by an
insurer of the Unfair Claims Practices Act); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 392
A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978) (financial damages to insured were foreseeable and properly made
a basis for a bad faith claim against the insurer; but the suit is in breach of contract); Fairrus
v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Ore. 453, 457, 587 P.2d 1015, 1018-23 (1978) (absent
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although holdings from other states were not controlling, the near
unanimity of other state courts indicated that California should
question continuing to hold a minority interpretation of the statute.148
The Moradi-Shalal court determined the intent of the California
Legislature in passing the California Unfair Practices Act by exam-
ining the history of the NAIC Model Act upon which the California
Unfair Practices Act was based. 149 The majority analyzed a 1980
report from the NAIC. 10 The NAIC report, written after Royal
Globe, recited that although some proposals had been made to create
a private cause of action, the NAIC advisory committee recommended
against including a provision providing a private cause of action
against an insurer for violating the Act.'-" In fact, the advisory
committee deleted one provision from the Model Act draft that
would have specifically included a private cause of action for viola-
tions of the Model Act. 152 The majority found the NAIC report
reflected the intent of the framers of the Model Act on which
California based the Unfair Practices Act, not to create a private
cause of action by a claimant against the insurer.153
The Moradi-Shalal majority then reviewed the legislative history
of section 790.03. The California State Legislative Analyst had re-
viewed the proposed legislation creating section 790. 14 The report
statutory penalty allowing punitive damages to be awarded in actions against insurers by
insureds for breach of contract, to use civil penalties to accomplish the same purpose would
be inappropriate); D'Ambrosio v. Pa. Natl. Mut. Ins. Co. 431 A.2d 966, 969-70 (Penn. 1981)
(insured was not entitled to supplement remedies in Unfair Insurance Practices Act by an
action in trespass to obtain damages for emotional distress and punitive damages because of
the alleged bad faith conduct of the insurer in denying the claim); Swinton v. Chubb & Son
Inc., 320 S.E.2d 495, 496-97 (S.C. 1984) (the claims practices section of Automobile Reparation
Reform Act did not expressly or by clear and unequivocal implication authorize a direct bad
faith suit by a third party claimant against the insurer of an alleged tortfeasor); Russell v.
Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Texas 1977) (insurer could not be joined
in the action because any statutory liability the insurer may have to the insured plaintiff was
not connected to the suit against the insured); Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 433
A.2d 309, 310 (Vermont 1981) (the Insurance Trade Practices Act does not create a private
cause of action); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 38 Wash. App. 438, 438-39,
686 P.2d 1127, 1132 (1984) (third party claimant was not the proper party to challenge the
insurer; there was also a substantial question whether the Consumer Protection Act was
violated). Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297-98 n.5, 758 P.2d at 62 n.5, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122
n.5.
148. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
149. Id. See supra notes 29-68 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of
the Unfair Practices Act).




154. Id. at 300, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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from the analyst described the bill as contemplating only administra-
tive enforcement by the insurance commissioner.'55 The Legislative
Counsel Digest, which accompanied the proposed bill, likewise de-
scribed the bill as calling for administrative enforcement; no mention
was made of a possible private civil remedy against an insurer for
violating section 790. 156 The fact that neither the Legislative Analyst
nor the Legislative Counsel observed the new act as creating a private
right of action was a strong indication to the majority that the
legislature never intended to create a private cause of action against
an insurer for violating the Unfair Practices Act. 157
In addition, the court emphasized that shortly after Royal Globe
was decided, the senate tried to enact legislation to abrogate the
holding in Royal Globe. 5  Senate Bill no. 483 provided that a
violation of section 790.03(h) would not impose civil liability on any
insurer; the intent of the bill was clearly to overrule Royal Globe.Y5 9
Although the bill never made it to the assembly floor, the majority
declined to find this as determinative of any intent that the proposed
legislation should fail.l 60
The Moradi-Shalal majority found numerous developments occur-
ring subsequent to Royal Globe that convinced the court Royal Globe
was incorrectly decided. 16' The court emphasized numerous scholarly
articles criticizing the erroneous nature of the holding in Royal
Globe 62 and the undesirable social and economic effects of the
decision. 6 3 The court found the large amount of criticism leveled at
155. NATIONAL ASSOCiATION OF INSURANCE CoMMAssioNEs, An Act Relating to Unfair
Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of
Insurance, at 392. See Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 300, 758 P.2d 58, 64, 250 Cal. Rptr.
116, 123 (1988).
156. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMIassioNERS, An Act Relating to Unfair
Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of
Insurance, at 392-400.
157. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d 300, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
158. Id. at 300, 758 P.2d at 63-64, Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
159. Id. at 300, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. See infra notes 218-221 and
accompanying text (Justice Mosk's strong dissent over the majority dismissing this "silence"
as no showing of the intent of the legislature).
160. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
161. Id, at 301-03, 758 P.2d at 65-67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123-26.
162. Id, at 301-02, 758 P.2d at 65-66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25. " ... the strained
interpretation of the statutory provisions, and the misreading or disregard of available legislative
history." Id. " ... multiple litigation, unwarranted bad faith claims, coercive settlements,
excessive jury awards, and escalating insurance, legal and other transaction costs." Id. at 301,
758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
163. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 65, Cal. Rptr. at 124. See, Note,
Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.; an Illustration of the Problems Inherent in the Royal
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the Royal Globe decision disturbing and, like the flood of contrary
decisions of other state's courts, pertinent to the determination of
whether to reconsider the Royal Globe decision.'
64
The majority relied on several commentators that suggested several
adverse social and economic consequences of Royal Globe. 65 The
commentaries claimed that Royal Globe promoted multiple litigation
because the holding contemplated, indeed encouraged, two lawsuits
by the injured claimant: an initial suit against the insured, followed
by a second suit against the insurer for bad faith refusal to settle.
166
The commentaries also claimed Royal Globe encouraged unwarranted
settlement demands by claimants, coerced inflated settlements by
insurers seeking to avoid the cost of a second lawsuit, and exposed
insurers to bad faith actions by both insured and third party claim-
ants. 67 The commentaries also found that Royal Globe created a
serious conflict of interest for the insurer when the insurer owed a
duty to the third party claimant. 1s Considering these commentaries,
the majority stated that the public will indeed suffer from escalating
costs of insurance coverage caused by inflated settlements and costly
litigation.169 The court concluded by stating that Royal Globe would
continue to produce inequitable results, costly multiple litigation, and
unnecessary confusion unless it was overruled.1
70
Globe Doctrine, 15 Sw. U.L. REv. 371, 377 (1985); Note, Bad Faith: Defining Applicable
Standards in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 917,
919 (1983); Note, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC.
L.J. 833, 843 (1982) [hereinafter Need for Legislative Intervention]; Comment, Liability Insurers
and Third Party Claimants: The Limits of Duty, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 125, 148-51 (1981);
Comment, Liability to Third Parties for Economic Injury, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. 87, 111-18, 125-
27 (1981); Note, Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit
Against an Insurer by a Third Party Claimant, 31 HAs rios L.J. 1161, 1176-87 (1980)
[hereinafter Right to Direct Suit]; Note, Extending the Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith
Acts: Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 7 PEPPERDInE L. REv. 777, 791-93
(1980) [hereinafter Extending Liability].
164. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
165. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297-99, 758 P.2d at 62-64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
The majority of the court relied on the commentaries although stating the court could not
verify the different arguments as accurate. Id.
166. Id. at 301, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124. See Note, note 5, at 1165.
167. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124. Note, supra
note 5, Right to Direct Suit, at 1186-87; Note, supra note 165, Extending Liability, at 790-91;
Note, supra note 165, Need For Legislative Intervention, at 851.
168. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124. See supra
note 165, Need for Legislative Intervention, at 851; Extending Liability, at 791-92, see supra
note 5, at 1183-84.
169. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125. See supra
note 5, at 1186.
170. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 302, 758 P.2d at 65-66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
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The majority found importance in the difficulty the lower courts
were having in applying the Royal Globe holding.
171 First, Royal
Globe held that a third party claimant could bring suit only against
the insurer after a conclusion of liability of the insured.1
72 The lower
courts reached conflicting determinations as to whether a settlement
constituted a conclusion for the purposes of bringing a Royal Globe
suit. 73 Second, Royal Globe held that under section 790.03(h) the
claimant has to show only that the insurer had knowledge of the
bad faith action; the claimant does not have to show the action of
the insurer constituted a general business practice.
74 The Moradi-
Shalal court found that no other state has interpreted an Unfair
Practices Act based on the NAIC model act in this way.1
75 The
majority stated that seldom will a claimant have the ability to prove
a general business practice of the insurer. 76 The majority found the
absence of the ability of a private claimant to prove a general business
practice as an important indicator that the legislature did not intend
to create a private cause of action within the Unfair Practices Act.
77
The majority stressed that the Moradi-Shalal holding leaves sub-
stantial administrative sanctions available for the insurance commis-
sioner to use against insurance companies that violate section 790.03
of the Unfair Practices Act. 78 The majority stated that, contrary to
the dissent, enforcement of the act by the insurance commissioner
would protect claimants because the insurer's would realize acting in
171. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
172. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
173. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, Cal. Rptr. at 126. Two other states
have found a private cause of action created in the statute but even those courts have rejected
the Royal Globe conclusion that a single violation of the statute is a sufficient basis for a suit
for damages. Id. at 297-298, 758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
174. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text (listing and discussing section 790.03(h)).
175. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 842. See Parvaneh




178. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27. In response to the dissent
argument that the insurance commissioner will not enforce the Unfair Practices Act based on
a finding of no published appellate cases, the majority said "surely we can assume very little
from the absence of apposite appellate cases." Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at
68, Cal. Rptr. at 127. The majority argued it was likely that the commissioner's efforts
prevailed without the necessity of an appeal, or that any relevant opinions were unpublished,
or that administrative enforcement was deemed unnecessary in light of the deterrent effect of
inevitable Royal Globe actions routinely filed whenever immediate settlement of the claims did
not occur. Id. See notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing the duties and enforcement
powers of the insurance commissioner).
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bad faith would result in a fine. 79 The majority further stated that
the courts still retain jurisdiction to impose civil damages or other
remedies against insurers in appropriate common law actions based
on traditional theories such as fraud, infliction of emotional distress,
and, as to the insured, either breach of contract or breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.180
2. Pending "'Royal Globe" Case Requirement: Final Judicial
Determination of Liability
At the time Moradi-Shalal was before the California Supreme
Court, numerous actions based on Royal Globe were already filed.
In overruling Royal Globe, the court held that Moradi-Shalal was
not retroactive.' 8' In the interest of fairness to the substantial number
of third party claimants who already filed suits based on a violation
by the insurer of the Unfair Practices Act the court allowed their
cases to continue. 8 2 The third party claimant suits seeking relief
under section 790.03 would be decided under Royal Globe.'83 How-
ever, the majority did establish a requirement for plaintiffs to meet
in order to avoid dismissal of their pending Royal Globe suits.'84
Moradi-Shalal requires a "final conclusive judicial determination"
of the liability of the insured before a third party claimant can bring
an action against the insurer. 185 The requirement of a final judicial
determination of the insured's liability also clarifies another Royal
Globe ambiguity.
In Royal Globe, the court did not explicitly consider what would
constitute a sufficient "conclusion" of the action between the injured
party and the insured before the injured party could bring an action
against the insurer for a violation of the California Unfair Practices
Act.186 In Moradi-Shalal, Parvaneh Moradi-Shalal settled with the
179. Moradi-Shalal, at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
180. Id. at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127. See infra notes 230-277 and
accompanying text (discussing common law actions available to the claimant or the third party
claimant in bringing an action against the insurer after Moradi-Shalao.
181. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127 (suits brought




184. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
185. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
186. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127. In Royal
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insured and her case was dismissed with prejudice; 187 the court
concluded that this was not a final judicial determination of liability
within the underlying action sufficient to bring an action under the
Unfair Practices Act. 188 Therefore, a settlement with prejudice or any
other form of settlement beyond a favorable judicial determination
of liability will not meet the requirement set forth in Moradi-Shalal,
and the case should be dismissed.18 9 In stating the requirement of a
prior judicial determination, the Moradi-Shalal court was not creating
a new requirement, but rather the court was clarifying what consti-
tuted a "conclusion" of the insured's liability under Royal Globe. 90
In requiring a prior judicial determination of the liability of the
insured before an injured party can bring suit against the insurer for
violating the Unfair Practices Act, the court considered prior appel-
late cases. The court concluded that Williams v. Transport Indemnity
Co. 19' and Heninger v. Foremost Insurance Company 92 correctly held
Globe, the court did not discuss the actual procedural prerequisites of a third party's section
790.03 claim against an insurer, except to hold that such a claim, "cannot be brought until
the action between the injured party and the insured is completed." Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d
at 884, 592 P.2d at 331, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
187. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 293, 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
188. Id. at 323, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The court listed three reasons why
the plaintiff cannot sue the insurer and the insured jointly. Id. First, a joint trial would
obviously violate both the letter of the law and spirit of the the Evidence Code. Id. Section
1155 of that code provides that evidence that an alleged tortfeasor is insured is inadmissable
to prove the insured's negligence or wrongdoing. Id. Second, a joint trial would hamper the
defense of the insured on the liability question. Id. Third, that damages suffered by the injured
party as a result of the insurer's violation of the Unfair Practices Act may best be determined
after conclusion of the action by the third party claimant against the insured. Id. See Royal
Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 892, 592 P.2d 329, 337, 153 Cal. Rptr.
842, 850 (1979) ("[ulnless the trial against the insurer. is postponed until the liability of the
insured is first determined, the defense of the insured party may be seriously hampered by
discovery initiated by the injured claimant against the insurer").
189. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 313, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
190. Id.
191. 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 959-961, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868, 874 (1984). The widow of a
decedent involved in an accident with the defendant's insured brought suit against the insurer
alleging wrongful refusal to settle decedent's personal injury claim. Williams, 157 Cal. App.
3d at 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 868. The Williams court affirmed a summary judgment in favor
of the insurer; because the third party claimant failed to initiate any legal action against the
insured. Id. The claimant argued that under section 790.03 the liability of the insured was not
at issue, only whether the insurer made a good faith attempt to settle when liability of the
insured was reasonably clear. Williams, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 957, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
Because under its indemnity contract the insurer could be liable only if the insured was liable,
the court said, ".. . the essential preliminary inquiry in any action alleging the insurer's
violation of . .. section 790.03(h)(5) must be whether the insured was liable in actuality for
the third party claimant's injury." Willaims, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 961, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
See Parvaneh Moradi-Shaal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d at 306-07, 758 P.2d at
70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
192. Heninger v. Foremost Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 50 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1975).
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that the injured plaintiff has a right to recover under Royal Globe
only after proving that the insured was actually liable. 193 The Moradi-
Shalal court reasoned that if the insured was not liable for the
claimant's injuries, the claimant did not have a right to damages
from the insured. 194 The Moradi-Shalal majority stated that without
a prior determination of liability of the insured, the claimant cannot
be permitted to recover for "unfair conduct" by the insurer in
refusing to settle an underlying unmeritorious claim. 195 Under Moradi-
Shalal, the insurer has a duty to settle when liability becomes rea-
sonably clear, but the duty to settle here is different from the right
of a claimant to recover under the Unfair Practices Act. 96 The
insurer, therefore, does not need to settle all claims under section
790.03, but does need to act in good faith when liability of the
insured is reasonably clear. 97
With Moradi-Shalal, the court has ended the Royal Globe right to
a private action by third party claimants against an insurance com-
pany for a violation of the Unfair Practices Act. 98 Moradi-Shalal
overturns nine years of case law concerning private actions against
an insurer.' 99 A third party claimant can no longer bring a private
action against an insurer for a violation of section 790.03(h) of the
Insurance Code.200
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk wrote the dissenting opinion with Justice Broussard
concurring. 201 Justice Mosk, author of Royal Globe, began with
"Royal Globe (1979-1988), may it rest in peace. ' '202 He claimed that
the majority has replaced Royal Globe with a "Royal Bonanza" for
193. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 308, 758 P.2d at 71, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. 46 Cal. 3d at 311, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32. See Davy Public
National Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960) (where an offer of settlement
within policy limits is subject under consideration, the obligation imposed upon the insurer is
to exercise good faith in considering the interest of the insured in the settlement, and an
insurer guilty of bad faith in refusing to settle claim within policy limits breaches the insurance
contract and the insurer is liable for the entire amount of the judgment).
197. Heninger v. Foremost Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 221 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1985).
198. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 287, 758 P.2d at 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 313, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
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insurance carriers and has removed a rule that served the victims of
unfair and deceptive practices.2°3 Justice Mosk claimed that the
majority created sweeping changes within a case in which Royal
Globe principles were not the reason for review by the California
Supreme Court.204 The dissent made four main arguments: first,
knowledge of one violation by the insurance company was sufficient
to bring an action;205 second, there are no cases in the recorders in
which the insurance commissioner has brought an action against an
insurer;206 third, the failed 1983 amendment clearly shows legislative
intent for Royal Globe to stand;207 and fourth, at least three cases
preceding Royal Globe held that the Unfair Practices Act authorized
action by claimants and did not give the power to enforce the Act
exclusively to agents of the state.
20 8
Justice Mosk first argued that contrary to the majority opinion,
knowledge of a one-time violation by the insurer was sufficient to
meet the Unfair Practices Act requirement of "knowledge of an act
or a general business practice." 2 Justice Mosk argued that the
wording of section 790.03(h), which prohibits knowingly committing
or performing with enough frequency to indicate a general business
practice, was unclear in whether the meaning was to provide one or
two alternate methods of showing prohibited acts. 210 The dissent
protested that the most logical interpretation of section 790.03(h)
provided two alternative methods of showing a violation: if the
prohibited acts were knowingly committed on one occasion or, if
knowledge cannot be established, then it would suffice if the acts
were performed with enough frequency as to indicate a general
203. Id. at 313-14, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 314, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 316, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See infra
notes 211-14 and accompanying text (Justice Mosk arguing that a claimant having knowledge
of one violation of the Unfair Practices Act is sufficient to bring a cause of action).
206. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 317, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Mosk's argument
that no cases brought by the Insurance Commissioner against insurers for violations of the
Unfair Practices Act can be found in the Reporters).
207. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Mosk, J.
dissenting). See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (discussing the failed 1983 amend-
ment).
208. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Mosk, J.
dissenting). See supra notes 173-179 and accompanying text (the Moradi-Shalal majority
discussing the burden of a third party plaintiff in being able to show the insurer's knowledge
or a general business practice).
209. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
210. Id.
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business practice. 21' Therefore, according to Justice Mosk, the ma-
jority opinion argument that the clear legislative intent of the statute
was to be an administrative remedy is not valid.2 12
Second, Justice Mosk argued that since the passage of the Unfair
Practices Act in 1959, there has not been one recorded case in which
the insurance commissioner took any disciplinary action against an
insurer for violating section 790.213 Justice Mosk found the absence
of enforcement of the Unfair Practices Act by the insurance com-
missioner a good reason for individuals to litigate on their own. 214
The dissent found the majority opinion's caution to the insurance
industry not to commit unfair practices and the majority opinion's
invitation to the insurance commissioner to continue enforcing the
laws completely unneccesary, since the code was not being enforced
anyway. 2
15
Third, the dissent strongly disagreed with the majority concerning
the silence by the legislature on the amendment initiated to overrule
211. Id. This interpretation of the section was adopted by a commentator in reviewing
certain amendments to subdivision (h). Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation, 7 PAC.
L.J. 237, 484 (1976). "There would be no rational reason why an insured or a third party
claimant injured by an insurer's unfair conduct, knowingly performed, should be required to
demonstrate that the insurer had frequently been guilty of the same type of misconduct
involving other victims in the past." Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316, 758 P.2d at 77, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 135. (Mosk, J., dissenting). The majority of the Moradi-Shalal court responded
to this reasoning with:
although the Royal Globe majority believed this proof problem justified its conclusion
that a single act will subject the insurer to liability for damages for unfair practices,
it is more likely that the majority's initial premise, that a direct action is permitted
under section 790.03, was incorrect, and that the provision was instead limited to
providing administrative sanctions by the Insurance Commissioner once an investi.
gation revealed such a pattern. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
212. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). The dissent noted that particularly in clauses (8), (9), (10), and (11) of section
790.03(h) a distinction is clearly made between the insured and claims or claimants. Id. See
supra note 18 (listing the provisions of section 790.03(h)).
213. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 317, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
The majority fails to demonstrate that such enforcement has ever existed. Since 1959
when sections 790 and the following Insurance Code were adopted, 62 volumes of
California Reports and 297 volumes of California Appellate Reports have been
published. In those 359 volumes there are more than 300,000 pages. On not one
page of one volume is a single case reported in which the Insurance Commissioner
has taken disciplinary action against a carrier for "unfair and deceptive acts or




215. Id. 46 Cal. 3d at 317, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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Royal Globe. 2 6 The majority found the legislative silence as giving
no indication of legislative intent. 21 7 Justice Mosk argued the nona-
doption of the amendment was not merely silence, but rather the
legislature's refusal to pass a bill that expressly overruled Royal
Globe. 218 The dissent stressed that the legislature's amending the act
in 1983 without changing any provisions of section 790.03 showed
an intent to leave the law as it stood.
219
Finally, the dissent argued that cases preceding Royal Globe held
the Unfair Practices Act authorized actions by private claimants. 220
The majority opinion dismissed both Greenberg and Shernoff because
neither involved any of the unfair practices listed in section 790.03(h). 221
The dissent found Greenberg,' as precedent for a private cause of
action under the Unfair Practices Act.23 Justice Mosk agreed with
the Greenberg court's statement that a fair interpretation of the
Unfair Practices Act was that the person to whom civil liability runs
should be able to bring an action against-the insurer. 224 The dissent
also cited Shernoff2 25 as further support of a private cause of action
existing within the Unfair Practices Act.226 The Shernoff court argued
that the disciplinary authority of the insurance commissioner was
limited to the restraint of future illegal conduct by real parties in
interest, and the commissioner possessed no authority to enter money
judgments. 227 Therefore, the Moradi-Shalal dissent argued that a fair
interpretation of the act was that the person to whom the civil
liability ran could bring an appropriate action.?5
216. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
217. Id. at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
218. Id. Justice Mosk found that under the circumstances this represents legislative approval
and confirmation of the Royal Globe decision far beyond mere inattention. Id.
219. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 295, 758 P.2d at 61, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
222. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 470. See supra notes 32-41 and
accompanying text (discussing the Greenberg decision).
223. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318-19, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37.
224. Id. See Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475-76. "Section
790.09 .. . contemplates a private suit to impose civil liability irrespective of governmental
action against the insurer for violation of a provision of the Insurance Code." Id.
225. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975). See supra notes 42-55 and accom-
panying text (discussion of Shernoff and other cases prior to the Royal Globe decision).
226. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 319-20, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
227. Id. See Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680.
228. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 319, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37 (Mosk,
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III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Without Royal Globe, an insured party can still bring common
law actions against the insurer such as: fraud, emotional distress,
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach
of contract. 9 The California Supreme Court held in Brown v.
Superior Court20 that every contract has an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing which requires neither party do anything
to injure the rights of the other to receive the benefits of the
contract.23' In Comunale, the California Supreme Court extended the
implied covenant principle to insurance policies and required the
insurer to settle in an appropriate case even though the express terms
of policy do not impose any duty to do so. 232 Under Murphy,
however, the duty of the insurer to settle a bona fide claim runs to
the insured, not to an injured third party claimant.23  Johansen v.
California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau23 4
held that an insurer must settle within the policy limits when there
is a substantial likelihood of recovery in excess of the policy limits. 25
J., dissenting). See Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 409-10, 118 Cal. Rptr. at
681-82. "[The authority to enter money judgments is in the courts], and Insurance Code
section 790.09, expressly reserves to litigants all civil ... remedies." Shernoff, at 409, 118
Cal. Rptr. at 682.
229. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 319, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37 (Mosk,
J. dissenting). See infra note 240 (discussing the limited statutory recovery available under the
California Insurance Code section 11580(b)(2)). If a judgment is rendered against the insurer
upon bodily injury, death, or property damage then the third party can recover directly against
the insurance company on the policy and subject to the limitations within the policy. CAL.
Ins. Code § 11580 (West 1988). In section 11580(b)(1), neither insolvency or bankruptcy of
the insured releases the insurer from payment of damages for a claimants injury sustained or
loss occasioned during the life of the policy. Id. § 11580(b)(1).
230. 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949).
231. Brown, 34 Cal. 2d at 564, 212 P.2d at 881 (1949). See Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
17 Cal. 3d 937, 939, 553 P.2d 584, 586, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 426.
232. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). See
supra notes 69-111 and accompanying text (discussing the Comunale decision and related
common law prior to Royal Globe).
233. Murphy, 17 Cal. 3d 941, 553 P.2d at 587, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427. See Shapero v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976) (under Comunale v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) and Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.
2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) the insurer has a duty to deal fairly and in
good faith with the insured in determining whether to settle). See supra notes 96-109 accom-
panying text (discussing Murphy and the affect Royal Globe had on the Murphy holding);
supra notes 69-95 and accompanying text (discussing Comunale and Crisci and their place in
the development in the common law of implied good faith and fair dealing).
234. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal Rptr. 288 (1975).
235. Johansen, 15 Cal. 3d at 16, 538 P.2d at 774, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 288. See Crisci, 66
Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17. See also, Murphy, 17 Cal. 3d at
937, 553 P.2d at 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
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The court developed the doctrine of an implied duty to settle in
order to protect the insured. If an insurer did not act in good faith
and consider the interest of an insured at least as much as the
insurer's own, the insurer may be liable for any judgment in excess
of the policy amount.2
6
Beyond the rights of an insured under common law, the decision
in Moradi-Shalal removes the ability of a third party claimant to
bring an action directly against an insurer for violating the Unfair
Practices Act.237 The third party claimant can bring an action against
the insurance company based on traditional theories, such as fraud,
infliction of emotional distress and, if accompanied by an assignment
from the insured, either breach of contract or breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.238 A third party claimant
has two main methods of bringing an action against the insurer for
breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.29 First, the claimant can receive an assignment
236. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. The Crisci court
stated that the expectations of the insured are that the insurance company will apply at least
the amount available under the insured's policy to avoid liability on the insured. Id. Therefore,
in light of this expectation an insurer should not be permitted to further its own interest by
rejecting opportunities to settle within the policy limits unless the insurer is also willing to
absorb losses which may result from the failure to settle. Id. See supra notes 74-79 accom-
panying text (discussing the Comunale listings of when an insurer may be found liable for a
judgment in excess of the insured's policy). See Comment, supra note 5, at 1165.
237. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 287, 758 P.2d at 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 116. See also
Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group, 41 Cal. 3d 782, 718 P.2d 77, 226 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986). In
Coleman, the former third party claimants alleged the insurer instigated a meritless appeal in
a previous action in order to achieve a delay and coerce settlement on the appeal. Coleman,
41 Cal. 3d at 782, 718 P.2d at 77, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 90. The Supreme Court of California
held section 790 was intended to apply only to prejudgment conduct. Id. Therefore, section
790 provided no basis for any subsequent actions by a former third party against the former
appellant's insurer. Id.
238. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 287, 758 P.2d at 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 116. The California
Supreme Court also held that nothing in the Moradi-Shalal opinion would prevent the legislature
from creating additional civil or administrative remedies, including a private cause of action
for violation of section 790.03. Id. The court stated, however, that thus far the legislature
had not manifested such an intent to create this private cause of action. Id.
239. CAL. INs. CODE § 11580 (West 1988). The California Insurance Code still has a
statutory alternative for the third party claimant to reach the insurer. Id. The Insurance Code
section 11580(b)(2) offers a limited ability for a third party claimant to recover directly from
the insured. Id. § 11580(b)(2). Section 11580 requires all policies issued or delivered in California
to contain the provisions of section 11580(b). Id. Whether or not the policy actually contains
the provisions, the policy will be treated as if the provisions were embodied therein. Id. Section
11580(b)(2) provides that policies must include the following:
A provision that whenever judgment is secured against the insured or the executor
or administrator of a deceased insured in an action based upon bodily injury, death,
or property damage, then an action may be brought against the insurer on the policy
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from the insured of the insured's rights under the insurance policy.24 0
Assignments here include the possibility that the claimant can nego-
tiate a settlement with the insured and bring an action against the
insurer if the insurer wrongfully fails to settle.241 Second, the claimant
can obtain a lien against the insured for the payment from the
insurer.242
1. Assignment By Insured of Rights To Third Party Claimants
In overruling Royal Globe, the court in Moradi-Shalal, by impli-
cation, reaffirmed Murphy as the law in California.243 Murphy does
not give a third party claimant a direct cause of action against the
insurer for bad faith actions. 44 Numerous rights may be assigned to
a third party claimant. Under Murphy, the insured may assign a
right of action for a wrongful failure to settle to a third party
claimant.245 Also, under Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Com-
pany,246 the insured may assign the right to sue the insurer for breach
of contract.247 Comunale further broadens assignable actions by al-
lowing assignment of the right to indemnity of the insured under the
policy up to the limit of the policy to a third party claimant.4 8 The
assignment can be made before the judgment becomes final; however,
the third party claimant cannot bring an action against the insurer
240. Comunale, 250 Cal. 2d at 654, 328 P.2d at 198 (1958). See supra notes 69-82 and
accompanying text (discussing Comunale).
241. Thomas, Third Parties Against Insurers, CAL. LAw., Dec., 1988, at 87.
242. Id. at 87-88.
243. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text (discussing the Murphy decision and
the developing California common law in the area of private actions against an insurer for
acting in bad faith).
244. Murphy, 17 Cal. 3d at 942, 553 P.2d at 587, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (the California
Supreme Court has frequently held that an insured breaches no duty to the insurer when he
assigns his rights against the insurer to the injured third party in return for a covenant not to
execute). See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing Comunale; that the insured
may assign a cause of action against the insurer regardless of any insurer consent requirement
in the policy). See also Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group, 41 Cal. 3d 782, 718 P.2d 77, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 90 (1986). In Coleman, the plaintiffs alleged the insurance company instigated an appeal
merely to delay and coerce a settlement on the appeal. Id. The Coleman court extended
Murphy and held the plaintiffs could not maintain an independent action against the insurer
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing within the policy (contract).
Id.
245. Murphy, 17 Cal. 3d at 937, 553 P.2d at 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
246. 30 Cal. 2d 335, 182 P.2d 182 (1947).
247. Id. The Trubowitch court held that a contract provision or a rule of law against
assignment does not preclude the assignment of money due or to become due under the
contract or of money damages for breach of contract. Id. at 338, 182 P.2d at 183.
248. Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 661, 328 P.2d at 202.
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on the assignment until completion of the underlying actionY49
Further, under Gray v. Zurich Insurance Company,20 a third party
claimant can be assigned a cause of action against the insurer for
failure to defend the insured.21 The Supreme Court of California
applied the holding of Gray in Samson v. Transamerica Insurance
Co. 212 In Samson, the court held the defendant insurer liable on the
judgment against the insured based on a wrongful refusal to defend.2
3
Samson held that even if the insurer honestly believes the policy does
not provide coverage, the insurer is liable on the judgment if coverage
is found to exist.2 4 A third party claimant may also enter into a
reasonable, noncollusive settlement with the insured and collect from
the insurer for failing to defend.2 5 Although the death of Royal
Globe closed a major avenue in which a third party plaintiff could
reach an insurer, Comunale, Murphy, Trubowitch, Gray, and Samson
show numerous avenues are still left to a third party claimant.25 6 The
249. Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 799, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401, 402
(1964). (See supra note 92 for discussion of Critz). See also Parvaneh Moradi-Shalal v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 313, 758 P.2d 58, 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 133
(1988). Requiring a prior judicial determination of liability of the insurer before a private
claimant can bring a Royal Globe action against an insurer. Id. Note this only applies to suits
filed prior to Moradi-Shalal becoming final; suits filed after Moradi-Shalal cannot use Royal
Globe as a basis of liability of the insurer. Id.
250. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
251. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 279, 419 P.2d at 177, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 102. See also Metz v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 3d 45, 55, 513 P.2d 922, 930, 109 Cal. Rptr. 698,
706 (1973) (suit by insurer seeking declaratory relief in which the injured party cross-complained
seeking the balance of the judgment from the insured); Geddes & Smith v. St. Paul Mercury,
51 Cal. 2d 558, 561-62, 334 P.2d 881, 887-88 (1959) (action by building contractor to recover
amount of judgment obtained against the manufacturer of defective doors); Ford v. Providence
Washington Ins. Co., 151 Cal. App. 2d 431, 435, 311 P.2d 930, 934 (1957) (person who
obtained judgment against driver of insured automobile brought an action against the insurer,
on the ground that insurer was obligated under the policy to indemnify the alleged driver;
court held that insurers failure to defend did not relieve the insurer of an insurers obligations).
252. 30 Cal. 3d 220, 636 P.2d 32, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1981).
253. Samson, 30 Cal. 3d at 223, 636 P.2d at 35, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
254. Id. The Samson court also found the insurer liable for failure to accept a reasonable
offer. Id. at 237, 636 P.2d at 45, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
255. Columbia S. Chemical Corp. v. Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 190 Cal.
App. 2d 194, 11 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1961) (if there is a wrongful refusal to defend, a liability
insurer loses the right to control the litigation and is liable for any reasonable settlement
arrived at in good faith and paid by the insured); Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal.
App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955) (where a policy contains an obligation of the insurer to
defend actions and claims against the insured and the insurer does not so defend, the question
of the insurer's liability to defend remains open for adjudication in a later proceeding, but
the settlement becomes presumptive evidence of the liability of the insured and the amount of
liability). See Saylin v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 179 Cal. App. 3d 256, 224 Cal. Rptr. 493
(1986) (where the facts learned from all sources reveal that potential liability does not exist
under the policy, the insurer may take the risk of refusing to defend the suit).
256. See supra and infra notes 230-277 and accompanying text (discussing the common
law avenues left to a third party claimant after Moradi-Shalao.
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common law routes left open to the third party claimant may take
longer to traverse, but the result should be the same.
After assignment by the insured, the injured third party can also
recover damages directly from the insurer for refusing a reasonable
settlement. 2 7 Under Crisci, the insurer has a duty to accept a rea-
sonable offer within the policy if the offer is the most reasonable
way of settling the claim .- s If a prudent insurer, without policy
limits, would have accepted the settlement, the insurer will be liable
for the judgment against the insured. 2 9 The insured may assign to
the third party claimant the right to recover against the insurer. 260
The insured may recover for mental suffering caused by the actions
of the insurer under Tan Jay International v. Canadian Indemnity
Co.26 1 The Tan Jay court reasoned that by taking out an insurance
policy, the insured was seeking to protect himself from harm, in-
cluding mental distress.262 The Tan Jay court stated that mental
suffering was a possible result of the insurer not defending the
insured and the insured suffering a large loss. 263 Therefore, damages
for mental suffering were included within those recoverable for the
insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.26 So far in California, damages for emotional distress have
not been assignable. 265 However, considering the change of direction
by the California Supreme Court in Moradi-Shalal, breathing new
life into common law actions against an insurer, coupled with the
court's finding a right to recover for mental suffering caused by an
insurer in Tan Jay, a third party claimant may have a good argument
for recovery of mental suffering caused by the insurer.
257. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 16 (1967). See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing that when an action sounds
in both tort and contract it is usually at the discretion of the plaintiff whether to elect a tort
or contract cause of action).
258. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 428, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
259. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
260. Id.
261. 198 Cal. App. 3d 695, 243 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1988).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. See also Truestone, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 165, 169-170, 127
Cal. Rptr. 386, 389 (1976) (damages for unintentional infliction of emotional distress are not
recoverable absent other damage to the claimant or property to which the damages are related,
however, damages for mental suffering are included within those recoverable for an insurer
breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing).
265. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d at 942, 553 P.2d at 587, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
427.
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2. Third Party Claimant Obtaining a Lien Against Unassignable
Causes of Actions
The insured cannot assign certain types of damages to the third
party claimant. For example, in Murphy the court held that the
insured could not assign causes of action for emotional distress or
punitive damages. 266 The Murphy court relied on Richert v. General
Insurance Company of America,267 which held that purely personal
tort causes of action were not assignable in California. 261 Since a
purely personal tort action is not assignable, the court reasoned that
a claim for damages based on emotional distress was not assignable
either.269 Also, neither legal malpractice claims70 nor actions for
recovery under a statutory penalty are assignable.271
However, the third party claimant may obtain a lien against the
insured's interest in a cause of action that is not assignable under
Purcell v. Colonial Insurance Co.272 In Purcell, the insured assigned
his cause of action for breach of the duty to settle, and the third
party claimant sued under the assignment.273 After the suit by the
third party plaintiff, the insured brought an action for mental distress
against the insurer z'4 The second action was held to violate the rule
against splitting a cause of action. 275 The court indicated through
dicta that the insured should have brought a single action in his own
name for all damages and agreed to have paid part of the recovery
to the third party claimant.
276
266. Id.
267. 68 Cal. 2d 822, 834, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968) (the only causes or rights
of action which are not assignable are those founded upon wrongs of a purely personal nature,
for example: slander, assault and battery, and negligent personal injuries).
268. Id.
269. Murphy, 17 Cal. 3d at 942, 553 P.2d at 587, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427. See also Dugar
v. Happy Tiger Records, 41 Cal. App. 3d 811, 819, 116 Cal. Rptr. 412, 416 (1974) (the general
rule is that in the absence of a statute, exemplary damages are allowed only to the immediate
person).
270. Goodley v. Wank & Wank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 389, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1976) (a third
party claimant brought a claim for damages for legal malpractice against a law firm; the claim
was held not assignable).
271. Peterson v. Ball, 211 Cal. 461, 296 P. 291 (1931) (a corporation's right of action
against the directors for creating debt in excess of capital stock is not assignable).
272. 20 Cal. App. 3d 807, 97 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1971).
273. Purcell, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 814, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. See also City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 464, 525 P.2d 701,
1409
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
IV. CONCLUSION
With Parvaneh Moradi-Shalal v Fireman's Fund Insurance Com-
pany, the California Supreme Court overruled the strained interpre-
tation of the Unfair Practices Act made by the court in Royal Globe
Insurance Company v Superior Court.2 77 The Moradi-Shalal decision
removes the ability of private claimants to bring actions against
insurance companies for violating section 790.03(h) of the Unfair
Practices Act as codified in the California Insurance Code. 78 How-
ever, the Moradi-Shalal holding was not retroactive so that cases
filed under Royal Globe before Moradi-Shalal can still be maintained
if there is a prior final judicial determination of liability of the
insured. 279 Under the prior judicial determination of liability rule
from Moradi-Shalal, a settlement between an injured third party and
an insured, when the case is dismissed with prejudice, would not be
a final judicial proceeding, and therefore the third party claimant
could not bring an action under the Unfair Practices Act. 280 The
insurance commissioner is now the sole enforcer against insurance
companies that violate section 790.03(h) of the Unfair Practices
Act.l' The Commissioner can discipline by using a cease and desist
order alone or in combination with a fine, if the insurer violates an
order.2 2 An insured can bring suit against an insurer for acting in
708, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797, 804 (1974) (as a general rule a party cannot split a single cause of
action because the first judgment bars recovery in a second suit on the same cause of action).
277. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 287, 758 P.2d at 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 116. See generally
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 866, 592 P.2d at 329, 153 Cal. Rptr.
at 842. Justice Richardson concluded his dissent in Royal Globe with these prophetic words:
Neither the statutory nor decisional law supports the majority's holding herein. It
seems predictable that in almost every case in which an insurer hereafter declines a
settlement offer the injured third party claimant will be tempted to file an independent
action against the carrier despite the clear admonition in our recent unanimous
Murphy decision that the insurer's duty to settle runs to the insured and not to the
injured party. The gratuitous creation of such a new remedy is wholly inconsistent
both with our own firmly established California precedent, and with a fair and
reasoned analysis of the applicable legislation. (Italics in original).
Id. at 898, 592 P.2d at 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (Richardson, J. dissenting).
278. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 287, 758 P.2d at 58, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
279. Id. at 313, 758 P.2d at 74-75, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
280. Id. (this does not apply to cases filed after Moradi-Shalal became final).
281. Id. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.05-09 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
282. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27. These
sanctions include the insurance commissioner issuing cease and desist orders to enjoin. CAL.
Ins. Code § 790.07 (vest Supp. 1989). Further violations of these orders may result in a
maximum fine of $55,000; repeated violations may result in a suspension of the insurer's
license for up to one year. Id. In order for the commissioner to use this discipline power the
acts of the insurance company must be shown to be of a general business nature. Id.
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bad faith based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.283 Third party claimants may obtain an assignment of the
insured's claim of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and then bring suit against an insurer. Therefore,
in overruling Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court in Moradi-
Shalal did not prevent an insured or a third party claimant from
bringing a civil suit against an insurer, but rather brought California
into line with the other States and reemphasized common law actions
still available to private parties against insurers.
A. Print Maggard
283. Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 236 Cal. 3d 752,
759, 686 P.2d 1158, 1165, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 361 (1984) (the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing has been extended to allow tort recover in non-insurance contracts). In
Seaman's, the contract was a bargain and exchange yet the plaintiff was allowed to recover
in tort for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. "A party to
a contract may incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to
shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the
contract exists." Id.
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